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In the recent case of Glossip v. Gross, the Supreme Court denied a 
death row petitioner’s challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol. An important part of Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
highlighted the existence of a relationship between the 
constitutionality of a punishment and the requirement of a 
constitutional technique available to administer the punishment. 
Far from foreclosing future challenges, this principle ironically 
highlights the failure of the Court to describe the relationship under 
the Eighth Amendment among three distinct categories of punishment: 
(1) the type of punishment imposed by the court—e.g., the death 
penalty, life without parole, or life with parole; (2) the method of 
punishment—the tool by which the state administers the punishment;
and (3) the technique of punishment—the manner in which the state 
administers the method of punishment. As Justice Alito suggested,
there is indeed a constitutional relationship between these 
categories—even though this relationship may not exist exactly as he 
indicated.
As such, this Article articulates a holistic model for applying the 
Eighth Amendment on three levels—the punishment type, method, and 
technique. This Article develops this taxonomy, making explicit the 
concepts implicit in a number of Eighth Amendment cases. To be sure, 
the Court has assessed types of punishments, punishment methods, 
and punishment techniques individually, but it has never offered a 
holistic framework by which to understand these related constitutional 
inquiries. This Article develops such an approach.
In light of the applicable framework, this Article then explores the 
Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment with respect to the three 
categories, demonstrating how the Court deviates from its doctrine 
when considering punishment techniques. It next describes states’ uses
of secrecy in the context of lethal injection, uncovering the manner in 
which this secrecy frustrates the application of the Eighth Amendment 
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framework. Further, this Article argues that the state-instigated 
secrecy does more than create doctrinal and societal smokescreens—it 
raises serious constitutional and legitimacy questions concerning 
lethal injection protocols. Finally, this Article concludes by exploring 
what transparency in execution methods might mean, both in terms of 
restoring dignity to death row prisoners and for the future of capital 
punishment in America.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“A lack of transparency results in distrust and a deep sense of insecurity.”
– Dalai Lama1
In theory, the ways by which states execute those condemned to death 
have become more humane over time.2 The shift in execution methods—from 
hanging and firing squads to electrocution, then to the gas chamber, and most 
recently to lethal injection—creates a perception of increasing societal 
maturity.3 From the perspective of the average observer, death by lethal 
injection certainly seems more humane than death by hanging or 
electrocution.4 This shift, however, tracks another phenomenon—the increased 
secrecy in how states carry out executions.5 Once a public spectacle,6
executions now resemble a quiet, serene, medical procedure.7 Indeed, 
executions have become so private that they remain one of the few acts in 
modern society that is not visible in some form on the Internet.8
                                                                                                                     
1 Dalai Lama: I Shout and Say Harsh Words, TELEGRAPH (May 13, 2012) (quoting 
the Dalia Lama), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tibet/9261176/Dalai-
Lama-I-shout-and-say-harsh-words.html [https://perma.cc/RQ8Y-EMPN].
2 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 206–07 (2002) (describing the 
“continual centralization and professionalization of punishment” and the development of 
new technologies of execution); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444, 447 (1890) 
(explaining that states adopted electrocution as the result of an “effort to devise a more 
humane method” of execution). Query, however, whether this increased decency rests only 
in the eyes of the observer, not the condemned. See infra Part IV.
3 Jonathan S. Abernathy, The Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence 
Rationale, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379, 422 (1996) (“[C]ontrary to what logic seems 
to dictate, the attempt over time has been to make the penalty of death gentle, hidden, and 
antiseptic.”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine). 
4 Indeed, as Deborah Denno has observed, one of the purposes of adopting lethal 
injection was to make the death penalty more palatable to observers. See Deborah W. 
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of 
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 86 
(2002); see also discussion infra Part III.
5 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has 
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 95 (2007) (describing the 
increased secrecy of lethal injection protocols).
6 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 7 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing a brutal public execution involving drawing and 
quartering).
7 See AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, 119–20 (2014).
8 DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE 
OF ABOLITION 52–54, 296–97 (2010); see also Annulla Linders, The Execution Spectacle 
and State Legitimacy: The Changing Nature of the American Execution Audience, 1833–
1937, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 607, 618 (2002) (discussing the history of audiences at 
executions).
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Lethal injection, as commonly used by many states, involves another layer 
of secrecy that hides the killing—a paralytic agent such as rocuronium 
bromide or pancuronium bromide.9 The use of a paralytic agent hides from 
those witnessing the execution what is really happening to the offender, as it 
renders the offender unable to move.10 It appears that the offender strapped to 
the gurney is drifting off peacefully into permanent sleep as part of a carefully 
orchestrated medical procedure.11 But in many cases, this paralytic agent 
masks the reality of the killing: the offender may be experiencing excruciating 
pain.12 The third drug in many protocols, potassium chloride, serves to stop 
the heart of the offender, but can, with an ineffective anesthetic, “do so in a 
torturous manner, causing burning, searing pain.”13 Because of the paralytic, 
though, bystanders often cannot observe any physical reaction to this pain.14
Further, it is difficult to tell whether the anesthesia given before the paralytic 
wears off prior to death.15
The increasing difficulty of obtaining the needed lethal injection drugs and 
surrounding controversy of the resulting changes in lethal injection protocols 
have cast a third layer of secrecy over the execution process.16 States have, on 
multiple occasions, refused to disclose the types of drugs used in the protocols 
and have experimented with new drugs and new protocols without informing 
inmates of the new procedures.17 They have also refused to disclose 
information concerning drug suppliers and medical personnel involved in 
carrying out executions.18
In essence, then, the secretive nature of lethal injection has resulted in a 
series of executions that may in reality constitute a form of hidden torture by 
masking severe physical and psychological pain. The trauma from lethal 
injection administrations may be even worse when the drugs do not work 
properly.19 This seems to have happened several times in the past few years, 
                                                                                                                     
9 State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenal
tyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/D53W-NK2T] (cataloging current state 
execution methods).
10 Deborah W. Denno, The Future of Execution Methods, in THE FUTURE OF 
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 483, 485, 490 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009). 
11 SARAT, supra note 7, at 119–20. 
12 Id. at 120 (“[B]oth the pancuronium bromide and the third drug, potassium 
chloride, which causes cardiac arrest and death, have the potential to cause severe pain that 
would be masked by the sodium thiopental and/or the pancuronium bromide.”).
13 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
14 Denno, supra note 10, at 490.
15 Id. at 485.
16 As Legitimate Market for Execution Drugs Dries Up, States’ Execution Practices 




19 See SARAT, supra note 7, at 122–24; Dahlia Lithwick, When the Death Penalty 
Turns into Torture, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politic
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resulting in horrific killings in which inmates visibly suffered for extended 
intervals.20
These procedures, however, have not gone without challenge. In June 
2015, the United States Supreme Court upheld a lethal injection technique for 
the second time in less than a decade.21 This decision, Glossip v. Gross,
seemingly foreclosed further challenges to lethal injection techniques by both 
sanctioning Oklahoma’s new protocol and adopting a doctrinal standard that 
petitioners will, in most cases, be unable to meet.22
An important part of the majority opinion in Glossip advanced the 
principle that, if a punishment is constitutional, then there must be a 
constitutional way to administer the punishment.23 While seemingly
foreclosing future challenges, this principle ironically highlights the 
constitutionality and legitimacy issues that new lethal injection procedures 
raise. The Court’s principle suggests a constitutional relationship between the 
punishment of the death and the ways that states administer it.24 This draws 
attention to the Court’s general failure to clearly and systematically describe 
such a relationship and distinguish three distinct categories of punishment
under the Eighth Amendment: (1) the type of punishment imposed by the 
court—e.g., the death penalty, life without parole, life with parole; (2) the 
method of punishment—the tool by which the state administers the 
punishment, such as lethal injection; and (3) the technique of punishment—the 
manner in which the state administers the punishment, such as by a three-drug 
cocktail of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium 
chloride.25 If, as the Glossip majority insisted, a constitutional method and 
technique must exist for a constitutionally approved type of punishment,26
there must be a constitutional relationship between these categories. Further, 
the corollary principle would suggest that, for a punishment to be 
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, all three categories—the type, 
the method, and the technique—must satisfy the applicable Eighth 
                                                                                                                     
s/jurisprudence/2014/04/clayton_lockett_s_botched_execution_the_grim_but_predictable_
result_of_oklahoma.html [https://perma.cc/7ZRF-X4A3].
20 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732–33 (2015); SARAT, supra note 7,
at 122–24.
21 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; accord Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
22 See, e.g., Jonathan Keim, Glossip v. Gross: Holding the Line on Lethal Injections,
NAT’L REV. (June 29, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/420493/glossi
p-v-gross-holding-line-lethal-injection-jonathan-keim [https://perma.cc/A24T-5SF7]; Ian 
Millhiser, What the Supreme Court Just Did to the Death Penalty, THINKPROGRESS (June 
29, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/what-the-supreme-court-just-did-to-the-death-penalty-
677a8b6f49e3 [https://perma.cc/XCH5-4UYC] (“Glossip v. Gross is a crushing blow to 
opponents of the death penalty.”).
23 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 47).
24 See id.
25 See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
26 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33.
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Amendment standards.27 In the capital context, for instance, a court might 
sentence an offender to the death penalty (the punishment type), using a 
particular method (lethal injection) that implements a certain technique (the 
protocol for administering the drugs). Each of these three categories—the 
punishment type, the method, and the technique—must receive scrutiny under 
the Eighth Amendment.
This Article develops this taxonomy, making explicit the concepts implicit 
in a number of Eighth Amendment cases. To be sure, the Court has assessed 
punishment types,28 methods,29 and techniques30 individually, but it has never 
offered a holistic framework by which to understand these related 
constitutional inquiries. This Article offers such an approach.
Having articulated the applicable framework, this Article then explores the 
Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment, demonstrating how the Court 
has elected to apply a new standard in punishment technique cases. This new 
approach has no connection to the text or history of the Eighth Amendment, 
nor does it stem from the Court’s own precedents. Not only is the Court’s new 
doctrine unfounded, but it is also built on a wall of secrecy that veils many 
aspects of modern-day lethal injections. This, in turn, we argue, frustrates the 
application of the Eighth Amendment framework. The state-instigated secrecy 
does more than create a doctrinal smokescreen; it raises serious constitutional 
and legitimacy questions concerning lethal injection protocols. Finally, this
Article concludes by exploring what transparency in execution methods and 
techniques might mean both in terms of restoring dignity to death row 
prisoners and for the future of capital punishment in America.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes “cruel 
and unusual punishments.”31 In over 100 years of litigation,32 the Court has 
                                                                                                                     
27 See id.
28 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64, 578 (2005) (reversing a death 
sentence for juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07, 321 (2002) 
(reversing the execution of a mentally retarded individual because of his lower culpability); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (reversing a death sentence 
for a rape conviction).
29 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that a mechanical accident during the first execution attempt by means of 
electrocution did not make the second execution attempt unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (holding that electrocution is a 
permissible form of execution under the Eighth Amendment).
30 See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134–35 (1878) (stating in an early case that 
“[c]ruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but . . . the punishment 
of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first 
degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the [E]ighth [A]mendment”).
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assessed government actions in this context in three separate senses—
examining the type of punishment,33 the method of punishment,34 and the 
punishment technique.35 In the capital context, for instance, a court might 
sentence an offender to death (the type of punishment), using a particular 
method (lethal injection), which employs a certain technique (the protocol for 
administering the drugs).36 Each of these three categories—the punishment 
type, the method, and the technique—receives scrutiny under the Eighth 
Amendment. To be sure, the Court has never articulated this three-part 
taxonomy as such, but it has considered the constitutionality of each of these 
categories depending on the challenge raised by a petitioner.
A. The Type of Punishment
The first level of inquiry concerning the constitutionality of a punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment assesses whether the type of punishment—the 
nature of the penalty itself—constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.37 For 
instance, one might examine whether the death penalty, imprisonment, 
denationalization, or even a criminal fine constitutes a cruel and unusual 
punishment.38 While the Supreme Court has held that denationalization 
violates the Eighth Amendment, it has shied away from making such broad 
holdings regarding other types of punishments.39 Indeed, aside from 
                                                                                                                     
33 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing 
death sentences); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that the Eighth Amendment bars denationalization); see also infra note 36.
34 See, e.g., Francis, 329 U.S. at 464; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
35 See, e.g., Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze, 553 U.S. at 41.
36 It is ordinarily a jury that imposes a punishment of death. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 
S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury. This right required Florida to base [the defendant’s] death sentence on a jury’s
verdict, not a judge’s factfinding. Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the judge 
alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore unconstitutional.”).
Statutes, which may allow for the offender’s election of method, ordinarily dictate the 
method used. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1 (LEXISNEXIS 2015) (“A death sentence 
shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively 
elects to be executed by electrocution.”). The technique employed in carrying out the 
punishment is ordinarily in the hands of the state’s department of corrections. See Denno, 
supra note 4, at 182 tbl.20.
37 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977) (plurality opinion).
38 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991) (finding that the 
offender’s life in prison without parole sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment); 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (discussing whether the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment).
39 Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“In this 
country the Eighth Amendment forbids [denationalization].”), with Furman, 408 U.S. at 
239–40 (holding the death penalty unconstitutional, but only as applied). In Trop, there is 
also the possibility that the Court was not prohibiting this punishment in all circumstances.
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denationalization, the Court has never held that any particular type of 
punishment actually imposed in the United States is cruel and unusual in all
situations.40
It is important to note that this inquiry need not be an absolute one—such 
punishments may generally pass constitutional muster but become 
impermissible as applied—when imposed for a particular crime or on a 
particular class of offenders, or when imposed as a mandatory sentence.41 The 
most noteworthy example of this came in Furman v. Georgia, where the Court 
held that the use of the death penalty—when imposed in an arbitrary and 
random manner—violated the Eighth Amendment.42 Further, the Court has 
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the mandatory imposition of 
death,43 as well as the execution of juvenile offenders,44 intellectually disabled 
offenders,45 “insane” persons,46 offenders who commit felony murder in 
certain circumstances,47 and most (if not all) offenders who do not commit 
homicide crimes.48 All of these cases limit the type of punishment, but only in 
certain narrow contexts.
                                                                                                                     
Although the Court seemed to suggest that denationalization is broadly prohibited, in one 
part of the opinion, the language could be read to suggest that the punishment is prohibited 
only for the crime of desertion. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 93–94.
40 See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has 
never had to hold that a mode of punishment authorized by a domestic legislature was so 
cruel as to be fundamentally at odds with our basic notions of decency.”). In Furman,
Justices Brennan and Marshall both argued that the death penalty was a cruel and unusual 
punishment generally speaking, id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 371 (Marshall, 
J., concurring), but a majority of the Court has never accepted this argument. The Court has
held that two punishments imposed by the federal government are unconstitutional, 
although it is not clear that the punishments are unconstitutional in all situations. Id. at 
239–40 (majority opinion). In Trop, 356 U.S. at 86 (denationalization), and Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (cadena temporal), the Court held that the imposed 
punishments were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
41 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306–07; Coker, 433 U.S. at 
592.
42 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
44 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–64, 578.
45 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306–07, 321.
46 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986)).
47 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137, 138, 158 (1987). 
48 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 437 (2008) (finding the death penalty 
unconstitutional for those convicted of child rape, but noting that the Court was “not 
address[ing], for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and 
drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State”).
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B. The Method of Punishment
The second level of Eighth Amendment inquiry assesses whether the 
general method of the punishment is cruel and unusual. For example, one may 
determine that the death penalty is constitutional under the first inquiry, but 
the second inquiry would then assess whether a particular method of imposing 
the death penalty—such as by lethal injection, hanging, electrocution, firing 
squads, etc.—might be cruel and unusual.49 To date, the Court has never held 
a particular method of punishment to be unconstitutional.50 In dicta, though, 
the Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment does limit the use of 
barbaric methods, such as burning at the stake, quartering, and public 
dissection.51 It remains an open question whether abandoned, or mostly 
abandoned, methods of execution such as hanging, firing squads, and 
electrocution still satisfy the Eighth Amendment.52
C. The Technique of Punishment
The third level of inquiry under the Eighth Amendment explores the 
degree to which the mechanics of a particular method might be cruel and 
unusual. For methods such as lethal injection, for instance, there may exist 
ways in which administering the lethal injection might be constitutional and 
other ways that may be constitutionally impermissible.53 Similarly, 
incarceration techniques can also violate the Eighth Amendment, whether 
imposed at sentencing or the product of poor prison administration.54
This last category in the taxonomy of prohibited punishments is where 
much of modern Eighth Amendment death penalty litigation lies. In particular, 
there have been a number of challenges to various lethal injection protocols in 
                                                                                                                     
49 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality 
opinion); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890).
50 See, e.g., Francis, 329 U.S. at 464; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.
51 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878).
52 States are continuing to explore returning to such methods, the most recent being 
Mississippi. See William W. Berry III, The Execution Methods Crisis, JURIST (Apr. 3, 
2017), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2017/04/the-execution-methods-crisis.php [https://perm
a.cc/D8F9-GMMB].
53 Lethal Injection: Constitutional Issue, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-constitutional-issue [https://perma.cc/5S6
8-NYEB] (summarizing recent Supreme Court lethal injection cases); see also Glossip v. 
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015). See generally Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) 
(outlining various Court members’ perceptions of the administration of lethal injection and 
the constitutionality of different lethal injection procedures).
54 One can imagine, for instance, a sentence entailing excessive amounts of solitary 
confinement to violate the Eighth Amendment in certain contexts. Sharon Dolovich, 
Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 884, 961 
n.306 (2009). 
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recent years, and the Supreme Court has decided two important cases dealing 
with this very issue.55
D. The Taxonomy as a Spectrum
It is worth noting that, while these three aspects of punishment—type, 
method, and technique—are distinct, they exist as part of a spectrum of 
punishment. In other words, they range from a macro-view of punishment (the 
punishment type) down to the micro-view (the technique used to impose the 
punishment), and it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the 
punishment type, method, or technique is the appropriate category for analysis. 
Despite this range of punishment, though, the same constitutional prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments applies; regardless of whether the 
punishment type, method, or technique is at issue, “cruel and unusual 
punishments [shall not be] inflicted.”56 Even though the constitutional 
prohibition does not distinguish between punishment type, method, and 
technique, the Court has recently applied different analyses depending on 
which category of punishment is in question.57 With little if any explanation, 
the Court has applied one test to the first two categories (type and method) and 
a different test to the third category (technique).58 When assessing the 
constitutionality of techniques, the Court has strayed from its Eighth 
Amendment precedents.
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN ACTION 
The Supreme Court has rarely found that any particular punishment type, 
method, or technique, on its face, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments. Instead, questions of Eighth Amendment 
constitutionality usually revolve around the specific use of a punishment type, 
method, or technique. Historically, the Court’s assessment of the 
constitutionality of punishments has focused on the core Eighth Amendment 
principle of dignity. This notion of dignity evolves as society matures, though, 
so the Court must continually reassess dignity in light of changing societal 
views of punishment and shifting accepted purposes of punishment. At the
heart of the dignity focus is the importance of, and consideration for, the 
individual offender.
                                                                                                                     
55 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731; Baze, 553 U.S. at 41; see also infra Part IV.B.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
57 See infra Part III.
58 To be fair, the Court has never formally held that a particular method is 
unconstitutional, but it has indicated in dicta that, in assessing methods, the evolving 
standards of decency would apply to such situations. See supra note 51 and accompanying 
text.
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A. Core Eighth Amendment Principles
In its 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles, the Court articulated two interrelated 
principles governing the application of the Eighth Amendment.59 First, Trop 
established that human dignity is at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.60 The 
state must treat even the worst offenders—those who have committed a series 
of brutal murders and those who have viciously raped children—with dignity
under our Constitution.61 The Trop Court also explained that “[t]he 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”62 In other words, the concept of 
dignity animating the Eighth Amendment evolves along with the evolution of 
societal standards concerning the punishment and treatment of individual 
offenders.
Dignity consistently serves as the starting principle for the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment analysis.63 In case after case, the Court has stated that the 
constitutionality of a punishment rests on the “dignity of man.”64 This dignity 
requirement has at least two facets: proportionality and humanness.65
Proportionality refers to a sense of equality between the crime committed and 
the punishment imposed.66 Humanness refers to the notion that the punished 
offender must be treated as a human being.67 Along these lines, the Court has 
repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture.68
                                                                                                                     
59 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
60 See id. at 100. While some have criticized the use of the term “dignity” as vague 
and even vacuous, the Court has consistently used it in its cases with specific meanings and 
connotations, as explained above. See id. For a more developed discussion of the concept 
of dignity, see generally Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the 
Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2129.
61 Ryan, supra note 60, at 2132–33. Bryan Stevenson captures this sentiment in his 
book Just Mercy, where he explains that no one deserves judgment based solely on their 
worst act, instead suggesting that one’s personhood is more than just his or her
transgressions. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 17–18 (2014) (“Each of us is more than 
the worst thing we’ve ever done.” (emphasis omitted)).
62 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. This idea stems from the Court’s decision in Weems v. 
United States, where it suggested that the application of the Eighth Amendment would 
change over time, as constitutional provisions were more extensive than the mischief that 
led to their adoption. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Interestingly, this 
view is consistent with an originalist view of the Eighth Amendment. See John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1741–43 (2008).
63 See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2140.
64 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at
100); see also Ryan, supra note 60, at 2142.
65 See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2144.
66 William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 74 (2011);
Ryan, supra note 60, at 2145–46.
67 See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2144.
68 See id. at 2146.
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Eighth Amendment proportionality issues may manifest as either 
excessiveness or comparative disproportionality.69 A punishment can be 
disproportionate in that it imposes a sentence excessive in light of the crime 
committed70 or the class of offender that committed the crime.71 This 
proportionality requirement includes assessing the individual characteristics of 
the offender and the crime committed.72 Further, to the extent that the 
punishment goes beyond the bounds of justified punishment, it would 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This includes a punishment that is 
imposed at least in part for the visual pleasure of the audience or of the 
punisher himself—a punishment involving sadism.73
The humanness facet of dignity largely refers to the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on torture. The Court has firmly and repeatedly stated that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits all punishments involving torture.74 For 
example, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court stated that “it is safe to affirm that 
punishments of torture, such as [public dissection and burning alive], and all 
others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth] 
[A]mendment to the Constitution.”75 More broadly, the Court’s cases have 
clearly proscribed as cruel and unusual forms of “unnecessary cruelty” that 
cause gratuitous “terror, pain, or disgrace,”76 including methods that cause 
“torture or a lingering death.”77 This concept may even extend far beyond the 
infliction of physical pain to also encompass psychological pain—both in the 
                                                                                                                     
69 Berry, supra note 66, at 90.
70 Id. at 94; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420–21 (2008); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–96 (1977) (plurality opinion). This also applies to juvenile life 
without parole (JLWOP) cases. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
71 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–67 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
316–17 (2002); see also Berry, supra note 66, at 94.
72 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603–09 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). This also applies to JLWOP cases. Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
73 Ryan, supra note 60, at 2145–46; see Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.); cf. Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1947) (plurality opinion) (“The traditional 
humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the 
execution of the death sentence.”).
74 See Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit
Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 583 
(2010).
75 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878).
76 Id.
77 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). To be clear, there remains an open 
question as to whether punishments must be both “cruel” and “unusual” or whether it is a 
unitary concept—“cruel and unusual.” See Ryan, supra note 74, at 569, 572 (arguing for 
the former—that the Eighth Amendment bars only punishments that satisfy both
categories). Here, the punishments described, while inherently cruel, certainly are unusual 
in their administration as well.
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anticipation of the severe physical pain to come, as well as the inability to 
exert control over stopping the infliction of pain.78
These facets of dignity focus in the first instance on the offender rather 
than on society more broadly.79 Both in its individual Eighth Amendment 
cases and in its general approach to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Court has suggested that its understanding of dignity revolves around the 
individual.80 The proportionality facet suggests that punishment beyond what 
is justified by the purposes of punishment—punishment for a different 
reason—“loses sight of the individual” and is thus unconstitutional.81 The 
humanness facet indicates that “[t]here are some punishments that are so 
inhumane, so uncivilized, that no one should be punished in that manner —
not even humans who have committed the vilest of offenses.”82 Punishments 
that go beyond this boundary are also unconstitutional.83 This Eighth 
Amendment focus on the individual offender suggests that, although a 
punishment’s impact on society may be important, dignity requires 
consideration of the offender himself.84
As the Trop Court explained, our standards of decency evolve over time, 
so courts must continuously reassess our understanding of dignity.85 To
determine whether society has evolved to a point such that a particular 
punishment contravenes modern dignity standards and thus has become cruel 
and unusual, courts examine both objective and subjective indicia of societal 
values.86
The primary objective indicium is the acceptance or rejection of the 
punishment by state legislatures.87 The Court has also occasionally examined 
the frequency with which juries impose the punishment, the opinions of 
                                                                                                                     
78 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36; see also Jones v. 
Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing on Teague grounds the question of 
whether lengthy delays between sentencing and executions make punishments cruel and 
unusual (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989))); Matt Ford, California’s Death 
Penalty Returns, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2
015/11/california-death-penalty-ruling/415716/ [https://perma.cc/GH45-5DWD]. 
79 See Ryan, supra note 60, at 2132.




84 Id. at 2132.
85 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Meghan J. 
Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Context?, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 847, 849, 868 (2007).
86 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 563 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312–13 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
87 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. This approach, which ordinarily equates to relatively 
simple state-counting, constitutes a measure of the punishment’s unusualness, although the 
Court may subtly be moving away from this method. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2470–72 (2012).
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professional organizations, and international consensus.88 This examination of 
the acceptance or rejection of punishments roughly tracks societal views on 
the acceptance of punishments—whether they comport with modern 
understandings of dignity. By tracking the acceptance of punishments, this 
examination also reflects the unusualness of punishments.89
Next, the Court brings its “own judgment . . . to bear,” subjectively 
examining whether the punishment serves various penological purposes, 
including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.90 By 
looking at whether the punishment serves these purposes, the Court examines 
whether the punishment is unacceptably cruel.91 There is some dispute 
whether a punishment is unconstitutional if a supermajority of states have 
accepted it yet the punishment fails this subjective test,92 but, when faced with 
the question of a punishment’s constitutionality, the Court has seemed to 
always find that a punishment either passes or fails both steps of this evolving-
standards-of-decency inquiry. In this sense, the objective and subjective 
examinations work together to excavate the depths of the dignity concept.
B. The Traditional Application of These Principles 
The Court has historically applied these concepts of dignity to determine 
the constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment. It has 
consistently done so in cases dealing with types of punishment, such as 
denationalization and the death penalty, and also with methods of punishment, 
such as with electrocution and term-of-years cases.93
                                                                                                                     
88 See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (observing the frequency of juries imposing 
punishment); Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (looking at the international consensus on a 
punishment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (considering the opinions of professional 
organizations).
89 See Berry, supra note 66, at 110–11; Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 81, 85, 120 (2010).
90 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 599; accord Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420, 434; Roper, 543 
U.S. at 561; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–21. Query in the death penalty context whether
dangerousness is an overused concept. See generally William W. Berry III, Ending Death 
by Dangerousness: A Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 889 (2010). Note, however, the surprising relevance of rehabilitation. See Meghan J. 
Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1231 (2013) (arguing that 
much of modern doctrine is premised on the notion that imposing capital punishment spurs 
rehabilitation); Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
121, 122 (2014) (examining whether finality of a sentence promotes or undercuts 
rehabilitation).
91 Ryan, supra note 89, at 85, 120–21.
92 See Ryan, supra note 74, at 603.
93 See, e.g., Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (mem.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94, 99–101 (1958) (plurality 
opinion). See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 169 (2011) (providing an empirical view of “dignity”).
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For types of punishment, the Court has used the evolving standards of 
decency to assess the dignity of the punishment in question. In Trop v. Dulles,
for example, the Court broadly determined that denationalization is an 
unconstitutional type of punishment.94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
first affirmed that dignity is the backdrop of the Eighth Amendment and that 
this concept evolves along with societal standards.95 It then explained that 
denationalization “is a form of punishment [even] more primitive than torture, 
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the 
development. The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and 
international political community.”96 The Court further explained that, if this 
punishment were constitutionally permissible, the offender would, “[i]n short, 
[have] lost the right to have rights.”97
In other type-of-punishment cases, the Court’s rulings have been narrower
but still true to the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, for example, the Court held that the punishment of death for the 
crime of child rape was unconstitutional,98 and in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court 
held that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to intellectually 
disabled offenders.99 In these cases, the Court has also emphasized that the 
“[e]volving standards of decency must embrace and express respect for the 
dignity of the person.”100 Consistent with precedent, the Court typically 
assesses the state of these standards by examining both objective indicia like 
state-counting and subjective indicia like the purposes of punishment.101
The Court has also followed these Eighth Amendment guidelines in 
assessing the constitutionality of punishment methods, although punishment 
methods have rarely been challenged. In In re Kemmler, for example, the 
Court suggested that the Eighth Amendment did not proscribe executions by 
electrocution (rather than hanging).102 The Court also suggested that the 
dignity requirement of the Amendment prohibits torturous punishments, 
                                                                                                                     
94 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
95 Id. at 100–01.
96 Id. at 101.
97 Id. at 102.
98 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
99 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
100 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12 (“As Chief Justice 
Warren explained in his opinion in Trop v. Dulles: ‘The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01)).
101 Joseph Trigilio & Tracy Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill: A Categorical 
Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371, 1396–99 (2011) 
(discussing the objective and subjective indicia courts assess).
102 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444, 446–47 (1890). 
418 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:2
though.103 In other cases, the Court has relied heavily on this idea of 
prohibited torture, emphasizing the Eighth Amendment dignity facet of 
humanness.104 While not finding that any particular method is 
unconstitutional, the Court has delineated the constitutional boundaries of 
methods in such cases by pointing to examples of torture and distinguishing 
the method in question from such examples.
Unlike with punishment types and methods, the Court has strayed from 
these constitutional principles in assessing the constitutionality of punishment 
techniques—an area that has recently seen significant legal attention. In this 
arena, the Court has largely abandoned these foundational aspects of the 
Eighth Amendment, focusing more narrowly on the elusive question of pain.
IV. LETHAL INJECTION AND NEW TECHNIQUES
The Supreme Court has historically followed these core Eighth 
Amendment principles related to offender dignity in assessing the 
constitutionality of punishments. To be sure, commentators have criticized the 
Court for massaging the facts, fudging its state-counting, and giving mere lip 
service to precedents,105 but the Court has at least generally maintained its 
Eighth Amendment framework when confronting these difficult issues. This 
has held true as execution methods have evolved from hanging to more 
modern methods. In recent years, though, the Court has strayed from these 
core Eighth Amendment principles in examining the constitutionality of 
punishment techniques.106 These cases have arisen in the controversial context 
of lethal injection litigation. Not only has the Court departed from its 
traditional constitutional guideposts in assessing these lethal injection 
techniques, but it also has weakened its analyses—and general legal and 
societal assessments of these techniques—by allowing tremendous secrecy to 
creep into the process of states executing individuals through lethal injection.
                                                                                                                     
103 See id. at 447 (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . are forbidden 
by that [A]mendment to the Constitution.” (quoting Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–
36 (1878))).
104 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36.
105 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court pays lipservice to 
these precedents as it miraculously extracts a ‘national consensus’ forbidding execution of 
the mentally retarded from the fact that 18 States—less than half (47%) of the 38 States 
that permit capital punishment . . . —have very recently enacted legislation barring 
execution of the mentally retarded.” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 316 (majority 
opinion))).
106 See Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal 
Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2007) (“Distressingly, the courts evaluating 
[Eighth Amendment] claims have almost no law to guide them. . . . No clear precedent 
exists to guide courts in formulating . . . remedies.”).
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A. The Transformation of Capital Punishment
Much of modern Eighth Amendment litigation has focused on the 
constitutionality of the various permutations of imposing lethal injection. This 
litigation has grown out of a long history of carrying out executions in the 
United States.107 In accordance with the evolving standards of decency 
framework that the Court first set out in Trop, “states generally have sought to 
introduce more humane methods of execution once the actual implementations 
of pre-existing methods were scrutinized and shown to be too barbaric, flawed, 
or open to a high risk of painful or gruesome error relative to other available 
options.”108 Hanging was the primary method of execution at the time of the 
Founding.109 But in 1890, New York instead implemented use of the electric 
chair after a series of disastrous public hangings before large crowds prompted 
a search for a less barbaric means to execute.110 Over the next several decades, 
states continued to experiment with other methods of execution, as the electric 
chair did little to mitigate the perceived barbarism of execution.111 Some states 
used firing squads or lethal gas, for example, but the results were arguably 
even worse than with electrocution.112 In 1977, two Oklahoma doctors 
developed lethal injection as a technique for carrying out executions.113 States 
viewed this method as an important improvement in the evolution of the death 
penalty, as it boasted improvements in terms of cost, speed, aesthetics, and 
legislative marketability.114 There was less concern about whether the method 
was indeed a humane innovation in punishment.115
B. Modern Lethal Injection Jurisprudence
By 2008, most states had adopted lethal injection as their primary method 
of execution, and most of these states had adopted a three-drug protocol for 
carrying out these executions.116 As the Court has explained:
                                                                                                                     
107 Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4–12, Baze, 533 U.S. 35 (No. 07-5439). 
108 Id. at 4–5; see also BANNER, supra note 2, at 169; Denno, supra note 4, at 91–92.
109 See Denno, supra note 5, at 62.
110 SARAT, supra note 7, at 63; Denno, supra note 5, at 62.
111 Denno, supra note 5, at 62–64; Far Worse than Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1890, at 1.
112 Denno, supra note 5, at 63. See generally SARAT, supra note 7 (discussing the 
historical development and demise of several execution methods).
113 Ziva Branstetter, ‘Father of Lethal Injection’ Talks About History, His Legacy to 
Oklahoma, TULSA WORLD (May 8, 2014), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state/father-of-
lethal-injection-talks-about-history-his-legacy-to/article_0bb18eb4-7706-524a-8bf0-
00a4f6117fa7.html [https://perma.cc/CJ2Y-NC3U]. 
114 Denno, supra note 5, at 65.
115 Id.
116 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 42–44 (2008).
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The first drug, sodium thiopental (also known as Pentothol), is a fast-acting 
barbiturate sedative that induces a deep, comalike unconsciousness when 
given in the amounts used for lethal injection. The second drug, pancuronium 
bromide (also known as Pavulon), is a paralytic agent that inhibits all 
muscular-skeletal movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm, stops 
respiration. Potassium chloride, the third drug, interferes with the electrical 
signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart, inducing cardiac arrest. 
The proper administration of the first drug ensures that the prisoner does not 
experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by 
the second and third drugs.117
Around 2005, two death row prisoners from Kentucky, Ralph Baze and 
Thomas C. Bowling, challenged this three-drug protocol as unconstitutionally 
cruel and unusual.118 They argued that the protocol created an unnecessary 
risk that the State would improperly administer the first drug—the barbiturate 
sedative—and that the death row inmate would suffer significant pain as a 
result.119 The Court rejected this claim, but in doing so it strayed from its 
traditional Eighth Amendment framework of assessing dignity and the 
evolving standards of decency and instead focused on the potential pain 
imposed by the punishment. Specifically, in Baze v. Rees, the Court concluded 
that an offender must establish that the “lethal injection protocol creates a 
demonstrated risk of severe pain.”120 The offender “must show that the risk is 
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.”121
After Baze, however, the question of the constitutionality of lethal 
injection remained unsettled.122 Beginning in 2010, circumstances intervened 
to complicate the business of lethal injection per usual, leading to additional 
death penalty litigation.123 In that year, the primary American manufacturer 
for sodium thiopental, a commonly used lethal injection drug, stopped 
producing the drug.124 Shortly thereafter, a major European producer of 
pentobarbital, another barbiturate commonly used in executions, began 
                                                                                                                     
117 Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 46.
119 See id. at 47, 49 (“[P]etitioners claim that there is a significant risk that the 
procedures will not be properly followed—in particular, that the sodium thiopental will not 
be properly administered to achieve its intended effect—resulting in severe pain when the 
other chemicals are administered.”). 
120 Id. at 61.
121 Id. 
122 Indeed, Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Baze predicted as much. Baze, 553 
U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
123 See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1380 (2014).
124 Id. (“In 2010, Hospira, Inc., the sole U.S. manufacturer of thiopental, ceased 
domestic production of the drug at its domestic plant due to an ‘unspecified raw material 
supply problem.’” (quoting Carol J. Williams, Maker of Anesthetic Used in Executions Is 
Discontinuing Drug, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/22/lo
cal/la-me-execution-drug-20110122 [https://perma.cc/DG9K-B5DC])).
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requiring its customers to promise they would not use the drug in 
executions.125 Unable to secure a central drug used in executions through 
traditional channels, states attempted to obtain drugs through questionable 
sources, such as “a ‘fly-by-night’ middleman operating out of a west London 
driving school,” “a man in India who told [a] Swiss pharmaceutical 
company . . . that he would use their free samples to provide anesthetics in 
Zambia,” and compounding pharmacies, which are not subject to the same 
rigorous regulation that large pharmaceutical companies are.126 States also 
continued experimenting with various new protocols for lethal injection to 
continue carrying out executions with the drugs to which they did have 
access.127 For example, Florida was the first state to experiment with 
midazolam as part of a three-drug lethal injection protocol in 2013.128 And 
Ohio first used the drug in a two-drug protocol in 2014.129 States have used a 
variety of lethal injection protocols that involve anywhere from one to three
drugs and make use of drugs such as midazolam, pentobarbital, 
hydromorphone, vecuronium bromide, potassium acetate, and sodium 
thiopental.130 Again, death row inmates challenged these protocols, which led 
to the Supreme Court revisiting the matter of lethal injection in Glossip v. 
Gross.131
In Glossip, the Court again approved the method of lethal injection and 
upheld the State’s technique for carrying it out.132 Drawing on its holding in 
Baze, the Court explained that the petitioners had failed to establish that the 
“protocol create[d] a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the risk [was] 
substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.”133 With 
                                                                                                                     
125 Id. at 1381 (“[T]he Danish company Lundbeck, Inc., the world’s sole producer of 
injectable pentobarbital, announced that it would not sell the drug to states for use in 
executions and would require its customers to pledge not to resell the drug to prisons.”).
126 Id. at 1381–84.
127 See State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 9 (“The six executions carried out in 
January 2014 represent[ed] four different lethal injection protocols, some of which 




131 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
132 Id. It is worth noting that, although we refer to the protocols at issue in Baze and 
Glossip as “techniques,” the Court referred to these approaches to capital punishment as 
“methods” in these cases. See id. at 2738 (“Our first ground for affirmance is based on 
petitioners’ failure to satisfy their burden of establishing that any risk of harm was 
substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method of execution.”); 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) (“[T]he comparative efficacy of a one-drug method 
of execution is not so well established that Kentucky’s failure to adopt it constitutes a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). Indeed, the Court has failed to distinguish between 
techniques and methods. 
133 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737. More precisely, because the petitioners were 
challenging the denial of a preliminary injunction, the Court applied the corresponding 
preliminary injunction standard: “The preliminary injunction posture of the present case 
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respect to the risk of severe pain, the Court acknowledged that assessing this 
risk is difficult.134 “[F]ederal courts should not,” the Court explained, “embroil 
themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.”135 As a 
result, the Court emphasized that it is the petitioner who bears the burden of 
establishing that this risk exists.136 Because the petitioners had failed to 
satisfactorily establish this risk that fell outside of the Court’s area of 
expertise, they lost on this ground.137 The petitioners also failed to establish a 
satisfactory alternative.138 With respect to this new doctrinal requirement, the 
Court relied on the assumption that, if capital punishment is constitutional, 
there must be a constitutional way to carry it out.139 Although the Court 
borrowed this idea from the Baze opinion,140 the Glossip Court transformed it 
into a requirement that the petitioner establish a new acceptable way of 
carrying out the punishment.141 Because the petitioners failed to establish such 
an alternative, they lost on this ground as well.142
Even after the drug shortages and constitutionality questions that gave rise 
to Baze and Glossip, lethal injection remains the primary method of execution 
in the United States.143 Although states have considered different lethal 
injection techniques involving a variety of drugs, many have continued their 
reliance on the injection of a paralytic.144
C. The Problem of Secrecy
In addition to this transformation of doctrine in Eighth Amendment 
technique cases, secrecy has increasingly crept into lethal injection executions. 
Today, state governments shroud modern executions with multiple levels of 
secrecy, a disturbing notion in an open, democratic society.145 Unlike most 
events in modern society, executions do not appear on television or the 
                                                                                                                     
thus requires petitioners to establish a likelihood that they can establish both that 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the 
risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.” Id. 
134 See id. at 2740.
135 Id. (alternation omitted) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 51).
136 Id. at 2739 (“[P]etitioners bear the burden of persuasion on this issue.”).
137 See id. at 279–40.
138 Id. at 2738.
139 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738–39.
140 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (“We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that 
capital punishment is constitutional. It necessarily follows that there must be a means of 
carrying it out.” (citation omitted)).
141 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737–39.
142 Id.
143 Denno, supra note 4, at 69.
144 State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 9.
145 See GARLAND, supra note 8, at 55.
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Internet.146 Once a public spectacle, executions are now private affairs, 
conducted in the presence of a small number of media, state officials, family 
members of the crime victim(s), and family members of the prisoner.147 States 
conduct these procedures in a clandestine manner, often late in the evening
and hidden from public sight.148 As a result, most Americans do not have 
access to executions today. 
Not only have executions transitioned from the public to the private 
sphere, leaving most Americans without the experience of watching someone 
die by lethal injection or firing squad, but also gaining any access to the details 
of these executions is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. For example, 
states keep the identifications of the executioners secret and, in the lethal 
injection context, states also keep the identities of the drugs used to execute 
the offenders hidden.149 As lethal injection drugs have become unavailable as 
European manufacturers have ceased making such drugs or boycotted their use 
for the purpose of executing prisoners,150 states have further experimented 
with new drugs and protocols, sometimes with horrific effects.151 In many 
cases, states have elected to keep the identity of the new drugs secret, as well 
as the names of the drug manufacturers.152 This is either to insulate the drugs 
from challenge, maintaining some independence of the departments of 
corrections that oversee the details of executions, or it is to protect the entities 
providing the drugs from the protests of passionate anti-death-penalty 
activists.153 This secrecy complements states’ traditional determinations to 
keep the identities of executioners secret.
There is yet another level of secrecy involved in lethal injection, resulting 
from often employing a paralytic to prevent the offender from screaming and 
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writhing as the state pumps lethal drugs into his veins.154 Instead, the offender 
lies motionless on a gurney.155 Most three-drug protocols follow the use of an 
anesthetic with the use of a paralytic.156 The paralytic renders the prisoner 
motionless.157 As a result, one cannot determine whether the anesthetic has 
had, and continues to have, any effect.158 And the full panoply of effects that 
the potassium chloride or other lethal drug has on the prisoner is unknowable, 
and thus remains veiled.159 The prisoner cannot communicate with anyone 
because of the paralytic—he cannot speak or move.160 The prisoner often has 
no visible physical reaction to the lethal drug other than to cease breathing.161
The body’s reaction to the three-drug cocktail becomes unknowable because 
of the paralytic.162 The paralytic also helps hide the psychological reaction of 
the prisoner to the lethal injection cocktail.163 Whether the prisoner feels the 
helplessness of being conscious and paralyzed remains unknown.164 This 
psychological reaction, specifically as it reflects the degree to which the 
procedure tortures the prisoner or otherwise degrades him by dragging out the 
experience of dying, remains unknown.165 Ultimately, these procedures appear 
medical in nature, with the prisoner in a bed with an intravenous drip.166 The 
secrecy of the procedures serves to mask the reality of the state’s conduct 
                                                                                                                     
154 See Denno, supra note 5, at 55–56.
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toward the prisoner.167 In many ways, the secrecy shields the lethal injection 
protocols from legal and societal scrutiny.168
V. SHIELDING LETHAL INJECTION
The change in doctrine and increase in secrecy that have accompanied 
experimentation with lethal injection techniques have led to the shielding of 
lethal injection as a method of punishment and of the techniques used to carry 
out this method. This shielding of lethal injection occurs in two ways. First, 
the new doctrine and secrecy have erected a doctrinal shield, making it nearly 
impossible to challenge the legality of lethal injection and its accompanying 
techniques.169 Second, they have raised a societal shield, preventing the public 
from effectively scrutinizing the appropriateness of lethal injection as an 
execution method and of the techniques now used to carry it out.170
A. Doctrinal Shield
Troublingly, the new lethal injection doctrine and the secrecy inherent in 
lethal injection proceedings provide a doctrinal shield; with the details of the 
execution remaining secret, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for 
opponents to challenge the procedure under the Eighth Amendment. Glossip v. 
Gross demonstrated this legal difficulty.171 Following its decision in Baze v. 
Rees, the Court in Glossip explained that a lethal injection technique must 
pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to violate the Eighth Amendment, 
and the challenger must also demonstrate the existence of an alternative 
technique.172 Without access to the identity of the drugs and executioners 
employed, and with the use of the paralytic, potential challengers generally
lack clear evidence of the specific harms that the procedure poses and how the 
technique might compare to alternatives.173 Accordingly, it has become nearly 
impossible for challengers to demonstrate such a risk.174
First, the paralytic often employed in these procedures shrouds any 
outward signs of the offender’s pain.175 As a result, the procedure itself 
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ordinarily fails to provide direct proof of the offender suffering pain.176
Despite this difficulty, the recent “botched” executions do provide an 
indication that lethal injection protocols have very possibly caused pain.177 It 
remains unclear whether this is a result of executioners bungling the anesthetic 
component of the protocol or whether an error in dispensing the paralytic has 
just revealed pain that is ordinarily present when states use lethal injection.178
Second, petitioners generally lack the ability and resources to gain 
information about the risk of pain inherent in any lethal injection protocol 
outside of instances in which it is employed on criminal offenders.179 And in 
these circumstances, the government has not made it possible to study the pain 
experienced by the offenders.180 Outside of this context, there has been little, if 
any, scientific research, or even the regular use of these protocols.181
Accordingly, there is a lack of information about how these drugs interact in 
one’s body, making it difficult for petitioners to compile evidence that the 
protocol poses a “substantial risk of serious harm.”182
Third, even if petitioners had access to information about pain possibly 
imposed by the protocol, it is difficult to assess what constitutes a “substantial 
risk of serious harm.”183 Petitioners and the state alike lack technology to 
reliably measure pain, and there has been little guidance about how much pain 
is too much.184 Pain imposed beyond what is necessary to carry out the 
punishment is likely excessive and unconstitutionally cruel, but it remains 
difficult to assess what amount of pain is too much.185 In tension with the 
Court’s statement in Glossip that, “because it is settled that capital punishment 
is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional]
means of carrying it out,’”186 the current techniques of carrying out lethal 
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2017] CRUEL TECHNIQUES 427
injection are not necessarily constitutional even if, among the currently 
employed techniques of lethal injection, they carry the smallest risk of 
imposing serious harm.187 If all currently employed lethal injection techniques
constitute torture, for example, they would be unconstitutionally cruel and 
unusual according to the Court’s long history of proscribing torturous 
punishments under the Eighth Amendment.188 Thus, the death penalty can be 
unconstitutional in all forms by practical standards of the Constitution despite 
the Court’s insistence that the type of punishment—the death penalty itself—
remains constitutional.189
Fourth, the Glossip Court’s determination that petitioners bear the burden 
to establish this risk exacerbates petitioners’ difficulties in obtaining evidence 
about the risks of serious harms posed by a particular lethal injection 
technique.190 The state is the party with the greatest access to evidence about 
the employed technique and the risks it poses to individual offenders.191 In 
some circumstances, petitioners do not even have access to the protocol that 
the state will use in the offender’s execution.192 And they certainly do not have 
access to the identity of the executioners and thus cannot make a claim based 
on the incompetency of the personnel carrying out the execution.193 This 
secrecy on the part of the state, paired with the unknown nature of the 
protocols employed to carry out executions, make it nearly impossible for 
petitioners to make out an Eighth Amendment challenge about the lethal 
injection technique used to carry out executions.
B. Societal Shield
Not only do the new lethal injection doctrine and states’ secrecy about 
executions erect a doctrinal shield protecting the death penalty, but they also 
support a broader societal shield. The effect of the three levels of secrecy 
inherent in most lethal injection proceedings—the private nature of the event;
the secrecy surrounding the identity of the executioners, drugs, and drug 
manufacturers; and the use of a paralytic—is a shield from societal scrutiny of 
lethal injection proceedings.194 In particular, by limiting the number of 
observers, states stifle observational accounts of what might be experienced by 
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those being executed.195 By hiding the identities of the drugs used, many states 
make it impossible for citizens to understand exactly the means by which 
states execute condemned prisoners.196 This also stymies attempts to research 
what is happening to those being subjected to these drugs and procedures.197
By refusing to disclose the identities of the personnel and drug manufacturers 
employed, states can ward off challenges to the competencies of these entities 
and individuals making the executions possible.198 And by using a paralytic, 
states hide any psychological or physical pain the lethal drug cocktail causes
the inmate.199 Without more information about the techniques used to carry 
out executions, the public (and the Supreme Court) cannot properly assess the 
suitability of these execution procedures.200
It is important to note that societal assessments of these death penalty 
techniques should bear heavily on legal assessments of the techniques. The 
Court’s historical Eighth Amendment analysis that focuses on dignity and 
evolves with societal standards relies in part on societal assessments—
primarily state-counting.201 If societal assessments change, then legal 
assessments might change as well. Accordingly, the societal shield protecting 
the death penalty feeds back into the doctrinal shield, making legal 
assessments of death penalty techniques ineffective.
VI. THE UNDERMINING OF LETHAL INJECTION
The doctrinal framework and the clandestine nature of lethal injection 
raise the question of whether there are consequences to the approach adopted 
by the Supreme Court and jurisdictions across the United States. A close 
examination of the lethal injection protocol used by most states demonstrates 
that serious consequences spring from the Court’s new lethal injection 
doctrinal framework and the decision to make the administration of the death 
penalty largely secret. Specifically, the secrecy of lethal injection, paired with 
the new doctrine the Court created in Baze and Glossip, raise constitutional 
questions about the lethal injection procedures themselves, as well as about 
lethal injection’s legitimacy as a method of execution.202
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A. Constitutional Questions
In Baze and Glossip, the Court abandoned the full dignity inquiry that it 
had previously applied in the punishment type and method cases like Trop and 
In re Kemmler.203 Instead, the Court shrank the inquiry to focus on only the 
possibility of pain suffered by the individual being executed.204 In doing so, 
the Court has strayed from its Eighth Amendment precedents, and, without 
explanation, now treats punishment techniques differently than types of 
punishments and punishment methods.205
In contrast to the Court’s approach to these lethal injection technique 
questions, the Eighth Amendment does not distinguish between punishment 
types, methods, and techniques. The Amendment instead states broadly that 
“cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted.”206 As the Court has 
stated over and over again that dignity is central to interpreting the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment for punishment types and methods,207 so too should 
dignity be at the heart of the inquiry of the constitutionality of punishment 
techniques like those now used in the arena of lethal injection.
The concept of dignity transcends the question of pain that the Court 
focused on in the technique cases of Baze and Glossip. As the Court has 
demonstrated in its Eighth Amendment punishment type and method cases, the 
core of dignity is proportionality and the humanness of the offender—
questions broader than mere pain.208 As demonstrated in the Court’s cases 
limiting the use of the death penalty, Eighth Amendment analysis considers 
the type, method, or technique brought to bear on the individual offender.209
Indeed, the use of the technique with respect to the individual offender ought 
to remain at the heart of the analysis.
The seminal case of Trop, itself, demonstrates that the dignity inquiry is 
much broader than the Court’s focus on physical pain in Baze and Glossip.210
The denationalization punishment that was at issue in Trop did not involve any 
physical pain, but instead the Court explained that the concept of dignity 
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prohibited the punishment because it destroyed the offender’s “right to have 
rights.”211 Even though physical pain was not an issue, the punishment was 
deemed inhuman and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.212
The Court’s new doctrine for lethal injection techniques and the secrecy 
involved in these executions raise some serious questions about respecting the 
dignity of the offender, which remains the bedrock principle of the Eighth 
Amendment. In particular, doctrine and secrecy raise questions about torture, 
experimentation on inmates, the neglect of viewing inmates as individuals, and 
preventing humane offender knowledge. Further, this doctrine and secrecy 
raise questions about challengers’ abilities, and their rights, to raise these 
important constitutional questions.
1. Torture
First, the procedures now used to carry out lethal injection, shielded from 
both legal and societal scrutiny,213 pose the very real possibility that states are 
torturing prisoners, regardless of whether this is intentional. Although states
have limited the number of witnesses able to attend modern-day executions,214
a striking number of modern observer accounts have suggested that inmates 
being executed by lethal injection may very well be undergoing some sort of 
torture.215 For example, when Oklahoma executed Michael Lee Wilson, he 
exclaimed that he could “feel [his] whole body burning” shortly after he was 
injected.216 In Ohio, witnesses observed Dennis McGuire “convulsing and 
gasping for air” during his execution.217 Similarly, those watching Clayton 
Lockett’s execution saw him “‘writhing and bucking’ on the gurney.”218 As 
Justice Sotomayor explained her Glossip dissent, death by lethal injection with 
midazolam creates a significant risk of severe pain.219 The typical use of 
midazolam occurs in cases where physicians intend to sedate a patient for a 
short period of time.220 Simply increasing the dose of midazolam may not 
increase the time of sedation, though.221 And if the midazolam wears off, the
inmate’s experience would be the equivalent of being burned alive from the 
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inside.222 In other words, midazolam may facilitate the imposition of a 
torturous punishment, hidden by a paralytic.
Individuals have observed these disturbing effects of the lethal injections 
despite the paralytic ordinarily masking from observers any pain that the 
inmate experiences.223 In these botched executions, the intense pain caused by 
the potassium chloride becomes apparent.224 This suggests that the number of 
instances in which these potentially painful experiences take place could be 
significantly greater.
To be sure, it is unclear whether this outward appearance of pain mirrors 
pain experienced by the executed individual. The pain actually experienced 
could be either greater or less severe. The paralytic could be dimming the 
appearance of pain by masking much, if not all, of it. Or the observed pain 
could just reflect physical reflexes not actually felt by the offender. Without 
adequate research on the effects of the drugs on the human body, it is difficult 
to know what exactly the offender is undergoing.
In addition to masking physical pain, the paralytic could also hide 
psychological torment. As the effect of midazolam remains unknown during a 
lethal injection process, it is possible that the prisoner might be aware of the 
paralysis, imposing severe emotional trauma on the prisoner.225
Death row inmates are still human; a death sentence may extinguish their 
lives, but does not deprive them of their humanity. To hide the details of the 
lethal injection protocol or identity of the drugs from them, however, denies 
them the dignity with which to face death. In some cases, denying such 
information could arguably constitute a sort of psychological torture.226 To the 
extent that the state imposes torture—whether physical or psychological—it 
strikes at the very heart of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishments. 
2. Experimentation on Inmates
The lethal injection procedures of many states likewise infringe upon the 
dignity of the prisoner because of the procedures’ experimental natures.227
Because states are injecting prisoners with untested lethal drug cocktails not 
properly assessed for safety, the prisoners strapped to the gurneys serve as 
guinea pigs.228 The drug combinations and doses are novel, and it seems that 
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the results—other than the likely death of the prisoner—are unpredictable.229
The offender dignity that the Court has time and again said is the backdrop of 
the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments 
means that the individual offender must be taken into account in carrying out 
punishment.230 This equates to not experimenting on these prisoners even if 
they have been legally condemned to die.
3. Neglecting the Individual
Even if the use of a paralytic does not result in physical and psychological 
torture, and even if these novel procedures were not experimental in nature, 
the decision to use a paralytic for the benefit of the observers undermines the 
dignity of the prisoner. While preventing the prisoner from convulsing on the 
table might comfort an observer, the decision to place the emotional comfort 
of the observer ahead of the effect of the protocol on the prisoner ignores the 
offender’s dignity.231 Under the Eighth Amendment dignity demand, the effect 
of the procedure on the prisoner in killing him ought to be the central concern 
of the state in establishing its protocol, not the degree to which the procedure 
would be palatable to an observer.232
The degree to which the masking of the procedure through the paralytic 
satisfies a broader state goal to maintain public support for capital punishment 
constitutes an even more objectionable threat to the prisoner’s dignity. To kill 
in a secretive way in order to engender public support for more killing strikes 
at the heart of the concept of offender dignity.233 An unconstitutional lethal 
injection procedure does not magically become constitutional simply by hiding 
it.
Further, the rationale for the adoption of new procedures in many states is 
startling. States have not adopted new protocols or chosen new drug cocktails 
because such procedures would improve the efficacy of the state killing or 
reduce the prisoner’s pain during such a procedure. Rather, the states have 
adopted these new approaches because they are unable to procure the drugs 
required by their prior procedures.234 Indeed, the unavailability of drugs has 
driven the new procedures, not considerations of the impact of the protocol on 
the prisoner.235 Attending to these outside reasons for adopting these protocols 
that put the offender at risk compromises the dignity of condemned prisoners.
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4. Inmate Knowledge
The decision to hide the identity of lethal injection drugs and the details of 
protocols likewise denigrates the dignity of prisoners. Irrespective of one’s
criminal transgressions, one ought to, as a matter of human rights, receive an 
explanation of the procedure by which the state intends to kill him, including 
the drugs it intends to use. Even the Court’s own decision in Ford v. 
Wainwright,236 where it held that executing “insane” persons is 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, emphasized the importance of the 
prisoner knowing what is happening to him.237 There, the Justices explained 
that, for a punishment to be constitutional, the prisoner must understand what 
is happening to him and why.238
5. Ability to Challenge
Finally, denying prisoners the information concerning the identities of the 
drugs, drug manufacturers, and executioners, and the nature of the protocol 
overall, infringes on their ability to challenge the constitutionality of such 
procedures under the Eighth Amendment. Where the states use judicially 
approved procedures, such a need dissipates, but in the current environment of 
drug shortages and changing procedures, the ability to know the identities of 
the drugs, manufacturers, and executioners, and the nature of the protocols, is 
essential to making a constitutional challenge—a right that every offender 
should have.239
B. Legitimacy Questions
In addition to the many constitutional questions that they raise, the new 
doctrine and secrecy in executions also suggest a number of questions related 
to the legitimacy of the method of execution itself. To be palatable, the death 
penalty must provide the community with a sense that it achieves justice in a 
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meaningful way through execution.240 At the heart of this effort is drawing a 
clear distinction between the act of execution and the killing that necessitated 
the execution—a distinction between lawful and unlawful killings.241 To 
accomplish this, the state must find a way of killing that “does not allow the 
condemned to become an object of pity, or to appropriate the status of the 
victim.”242
Historically, the state achieved legitimacy in its use of the death penalty by 
making public executions the center of its approach.243 This included 
attempting to achieve some level of equivalence between the pain inflicted in 
the crime and the pain inflicted in the state killing.244 Public executions also 
served the goal of general deterrence.
As society’s standards of decency have evolved, however, the source of 
legitimacy has shifted. Instead of achieving legitimacy through brutality, states 
increasingly have achieved legitimacy through making the killing seem 
dignified, quiet, and tranquil.245 The decision to adopt lethal injection as a 
method, including employing a paralytic, arose from such a sentiment—that 
societal support of the death penalty hinged upon minimizing its brutality.246
Ironically, however, the use of secrecy in lethal injection procedures has 
the opposite effect—it threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the method 
and its procedures, as well as the death penalty more generally. The use of the 
paralytic in carrying out executions raises questions as to whether the 
procedure itself matches the calm medical procedure it portrays.247 As the 
paralytic is not necessary to accomplish the killing, its use raises important 
questions about legitimacy.248
First, if the paralytic masks real and significant pain, then the state 
effectively hides its method of barbaric killing from the public. Further, if the 
paralytic’s only purpose is to hide this pain—a serious possibility considering 
that the paralytic serves no real medical purpose here—then using it raises 
serious questions about what the state intends to hide.
Second, if the paralytic masks only subtle, painless manifestations of 
lethal injection, such as a body violently convulsing in response to a lethal 
drug, it still suggests that the procedure performed has some impropriety. The 
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decision to hide the true consequence of lethal injection from observers
suggests, at the very least, some public discomfort with the procedure.249
To be sure, the manner in which the state carries out lethal injection 
procedures presents a misleading picture. By making the lethal injection 
appear like a peaceful, tranquil medical procedure, the state attempts to 
differentiate its killing from the condemned aggravated murder it punishes.250
But the secrecy of the process—the great lengths taken to hide the reality of 
the state’s act, which amounts to a violent taking of a human life—casts doubt 
on the legitimacy of the killing.
The broader secrecy surrounding death procedures likewise raises 
questions about the legitimacy of lethal injection. By hiding the execution 
from society, the state disassociates the reality of its killings from the justice it 
purportedly imposes.251 States do not have to televise executions to secure 
their legitimacy, but cloaking them with secrecy and making them generally 
unavailable to the media, much less the public at large, undermines their 
efficacy in distinguishing these killings from unlawful ones and also in 
deterring future offenders.252
The decision to hide the identities of the drugs and their manufacturers, 
and the identities of the personnel involved in the executions, likewise 
undermines the legitimacy of lethal injection.253 The fear of retaliation from 
those who oppose the death penalty does not entirely explain or justify this 
secrecy.254 Further, the lengths to which states have gone to obtain lethal 
injection drugs, including alleged illegal methods of doing so, suggests a 
surprising desperateness to execute those condemned to die, at least in some 
states. But the decision to hide the means by which the state endeavors to do 
so indicates a degree of shame or perhaps impropriety that makes secrecy 
necessary.255 The secrecy obscures an entire line of inquiry about the 
appropriateness of the state conducting the procedure in the first place.
Finally, hiding the process by which the state executes its prisoners 
undermines legitimacy in that it offends basic concepts of democracy. Again, 
it erects a societal shield by which ordinary citizens lack the resources to form 
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educated opinions about the propriety of these executions.256 In order to 
determine whether a death procedure is consistent with societal values, 
citizens must have some understanding of the manner in which the state 
imposes capital punishment.257 The clandestine nature of the proceeding, the 
failure to disclose the identity of the drugs used and their manufacturers, the 
lack of information about the executioners, and the effects of the lethal 
injection cocktail hidden by the paralytic all hide common knowledge of the 
death penalty.258 This thwarts the democratic principle of providing citizens a 
voice in the manner in which a state punishes its criminals.
In sum, the Court’s new doctrine and the extreme secrecy involved in 
today’s executions raise real questions of legitimacy. Portraying modern 
executions as serene medical procedures serves evolved societal expectations 
of decency. But this portrayal also shifts the justification for the practice from 
achieving equivalence between the crime and punishment through brutality to 
making the punishment death alone rather than one accompanied by pain and 
suffering. States have gone to great lengths to construct this image. But states’
insistence on the many levels of secrecy shrouding modern executions 
paradoxically reveals that this image may be just that—only an image. Instead 
of justifying executions, this secrecy raises concerns about the legitimacy of 
executions.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSPARENCY
The Court’s new doctrine and the veil of secrecy surrounding today’s
executions raise the question of what consequences might flow from 
transparency. Transparency could be achieved on several levels. Televising or 
streaming executions would make them publicly available.259 This would spur 
the public to be more aware of the executions that are currently taking place 
behind closed doors and it would also at least in part expose the gruesome 
nature of these events.260 The thought of making executions mainstream may 
seem unnecessary and horrifying,261 but, if this is the case, perhaps that means 
that executions, themselves, are unnecessary and horrifying. If our appetites 
for brutality and violence have changed since the first executions in this 
country, then perhaps our punishments should change as well, and not just in 
their appearances. Hiding the brutality does not change the brutality.
Eliminating the use of paralytics in executions and revealing the drugs, 
drug manufacturers, and executioners involved in lethal injection procedures
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could also improve transparency.262 These moves would be less extreme and 
likely would be more politically palatable and easier to achieve. Eliminating 
these levels of secrecy, though, would begin to shatter the impression that 
modern executions are serene medical events.263 Even by lifting only these 
less extreme measures of secrecy, significantly greater transparency can be 
achieved, ameliorating some of the constitutional and legitimacy concerns 
already raised. If the states removed the paralytic, one could view, at least 
externally, the effect of the drugs on the prisoner, including the physical and 
verbal reaction of the prisoner to the drugs.264 Making the identities and 
manufacturers of the drugs employed publicly available would allow further 
study of the drugs and increase the understanding of how they might operate to 
kill the prisoner.265 Similarly, identifying the individual executioners might 
generate an evaluation of the qualifications needed to conduct an execution.266
Exposing all of these facets of executions would spur a reassessment of 
whether the techniques uphold the dignity of executed offenders.267 It would
further a more informed determination of whether these executions amount to 
torture.268 It would provide the opportunity for further research on the drugs 
employed so that experimentation on the death row offenders would no longer 
be necessary.269 It would refocus the spotlight on what the individual 
offenders are experiencing rather than on the observer’s experience.270 And it 
would allow the offenders to have adequate information about what will 
happen to them during the procedure.271 In each of these senses, states would 
be less likely to violate the Eighth Amendment requirement of respecting
offender dignity.
The perhaps more significant consequence of making lethal injection 
executions more transparent would be a societal reconsideration of lethal 
injection as a method of execution, and the acceptability of the death penalty 
more generally.272 Removing the paralytic might reveal a more gruesome kind 
of death penalty. The true nature of lethal injection, unsheathed, might not 
reflect the serene scene projected by procedures using a paralytic.273 The 
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botched lethal injections in recent years demonstrate this reality.274 If a 
paralytic-free lethal injection even partially mirrors the botched execution 
outcomes, then the death penalty will face the same scrutiny as it did during 
the time that states abandoned electrocution for lethal injection.275 As with 
electrocution, such a method would raise constitutional questions, both in 
terms of torture and dignity more broadly.
Similarly, a public understanding of the drugs states use, and the 
physiological manner in which they cause death, might undermine public 
enthusiasm for lethal injection as a method of execution. The idea that states 
are experimenting on death row inmates may strike some observers as 
unsavory and questionable. The lack of medical knowledge concerning how 
the chosen drug cocktails interact might also cast doubt upon lethal injection 
as a method of execution.
Further, a review of the credentials held by executioners might give public 
observers pause. Greater examination of the roles of the medical personnel 
involved—or to the extent medical personnel are not involved—in executions 
could dispel for some the myth of the medical nature of today’s lethal 
injections. This, too, might have an effect on the public’s acceptance of any 
particular lethal injection technique or of the method of lethal injection overall.
Greater transparency, then, might call into question modern lethal 
injection techniques and the method of lethal injection itself. In light of the 
current pharmaceuticals available,276 states may not be able to administer 
lethal injection in a way that does not cause a violent physical reaction on the 
part of the prisoner. States may not be able to administer it in a way that does 
not constitute experimentation on vulnerable human beings. If the public will 
not tolerate these modern techniques, then perhaps we must search for a 
different method of execution. Some states and scholars have already called 
for a return to firing squads, electrocution, and other execution methods.277
Whether it is constitutional to reach back into history and resurrect old 
methods of execution remains to be decided.278 But it is important to 
remember that states largely disregarded these older methods with the advent 
of lethal injection because of the belief that other methods were much more 
brutal. While a small, conservative minority might embrace a return to one or 
more of these methods, an affirmative step to use one of these techniques may 
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also further diminish support for capital punishment.279 A single hanging or 
electrocution might be enough to convince many states to pursue the path 
toward abolition, like seven states have done since 2004.280 So, with an 
acceptable method of punishment in question, the propriety of the death 
penalty, itself, is also in question. Indeed, the future of the death penalty might 
hinge on the ability of states to conduct lethal injections in a humane manner. 
A core sentiment in the Glossip opinion rested upon making sure that the 
“guerilla warfare” attacks on suppliers of lethal injection drugs by death 
penalty abolitionists did not succeed.281 As such, if the death penalty is 
constitutional, the Court explained, there must be a constitutional technique for 
administering it.282 For any particular punishment to be constitutional, 
however, every facet of the punishment must be constitutional—the technique, 
the method, and the type of punishment. If there is no constitutional way to 
carry out the punishment of death then, although the death penalty itself may 
be constitutional, states cannot legally use it. Just because the death penalty 
may in theory be constitutional does not mean that the Constitution tolerates 
torture just to impose that type of punishment. 
Certainly, it is unlikely that the unavailability of a particular technique or 
method of execution will result in the ultimate death of capital punishment in 
America. Nonetheless, transparency in the current lethal injection 
procedures—including public viewing of the killings; public knowledge of the 
drug identities, drug manufacturers, and individual executioners; and removal 
of the paralytic—might be an important means to accelerate the decline of the 
death penalty in the United States. If the public had information to actually 
assess the propriety of these death penalty techniques, it could really affect 
societal assessment of them. The popularity and constitutionality of the death 
penalty has waxed and waned in this country since its founding.283 In 2015, 
the death-sentencing rate again declined, and the number of executions 
                                                                                                                     
279 There are significant questions as to whether a return to older methods would be 
constitutional. Id. But see Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.) (arguing that Arthur’s request for a firing 
squad satisfies the Glossip standard).
280 States with and Without the Death Penalty as of November 9, 2016, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/5XDE-R4NF]; see also Meghan J. Ryan, On the Road to Abolition: 
Capital Punishment and Its Uncertain Future in the United States, JURIST (Feb. 24, 
2016), http://jurist.org/forum/2016/02/meghan-ryan-capital-punishment.php [https://perma.
cc/5RVG-GAX5].
281 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733–34 (2015); Kim Bellware, Justice Alito 
Blasts Death Penalty Abolitionists for ‘Guerrilla War,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/29/alito-death-penalty-guerrilla-war_n_717571
8.html [https://perma.cc/ND8N-U6T2].
282 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33.
283 Jeffrey M. Jones, The Death Penalty, GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2002),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9913/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EFK-MS3R].
440 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:2
decreased.284 Perhaps even more tellingly, the geography of the use of the 
death penalty over the past decade reveals that only a handful of counties are 
responsible for a large majority of the executions in the United States.285 Even 
in recent polls asking whether the death penalty is a good idea, people’s
answers differ depending on how the question is asked. If the surveyed 
individuals are given the option of a heinous murderer being sentenced to life 
in prison instead of death, their support for the death penalty drops.286 Without 
a doubt, support for the death penalty continues to decline, even with the 
current clandestine use of lethal injection.287 And maintaining secrecy about 
the details of capital punishment fosters support for the punishment.288
Without this secrecy, public support for lethal injections could very well 
plummet.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s modern approach to lethal injection jurisprudence is 
problematic. In its recent cases, the Court has strayed from its traditional 
Eighth Amendment precedents in addressing whether various lethal injection 
techniques amount to unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishments. 
Instead of focusing on the dignity of offenders and the evolving standards of 
decency that affect this analysis, the Court has focused almost exclusively on 
offender pain. In doing so, the Court has separated out lethal injection 
technique questions from more traditional questions of punishment types and 
methods. Problematically, the Court has done this without acknowledging or 
explaining the reasons for this departure. 
While creating this new doctrine, the Court has also tolerated significant 
secrecy to creep into the practice of lethal injection. These components have 
shielded lethal injection from effective doctrinal challenges as well as from 
true societal scrutiny. Moreover, the Court’s new doctrine and the secrecy that 
surrounds today’s executions raise a whole host of constitutional and 
legitimacy concerns. Together, they hide the potentially torturous 
consequences of lethal injection, cultivate experimentation on death row 
inmates, neglect the individual offender, and prevent inmates from 
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understanding what is happening to them in their final hours. Further, the 
Court’s approach makes it exceedingly difficult for death row inmates to 
challenge the techniques that will be used to carry out their lethal injection 
executions. Additionally, because of the great lengths to which states go to 
hide the nuances of their lethal injection procedures, one might argue that the 
justifications for execution diminish with the decreased deterrence value and 
retributive force of medicalized executions. 
Transparency in the realm of executions may be difficult to implement, 
but lifting at least one layer of secrecy could very well expose the unsettling 
underbelly of executions in modern-day America. It could reveal unintentional 
torture, experimentation, and various incompetencies. This could, in turn, 
significantly erode support for lethal injection and the death penalty overall.
The Glossip Court suggested that, because the death penalty is 
constitutional, there must be a constitutional way to carry it out. But the 
constitutionality of the death penalty cannot justify torturous or otherwise 
unconstitutional punishment methods or techniques. In losing sight of the 
relationship between punishment types, methods, and techniques, the Court 
lost its way in navigating how the Eighth Amendment must apply to lethal 
injection and the various techniques for carrying it out. In doing so, the Court 
has unintentionally undermined not only the constitutionality of the death 
penalty as applied in this country but also its legitimacy.

